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Abstract The purpose of this paper is to analyse the nature of bureaucratization
within public research bodies and its relationship to scientiﬁc performance, focusing
on an Italian case-study. The main ﬁnding is that the bureaucratization of the
research sector has two dimensions: public research labs have academic bureau-
cratization since researchers spend an increasing part of their time in administrative
matters (i.e., preparing grant applications, managing grants/projects, and so on);
whereas universities mainly have administrative bureaucratization generated by the
increase over time of administrative staff in comparison with researchers and fac-
ulty. In addition, I show that research units with higher bureaucratization have lower
scientiﬁc performance.
Keywords Administrative burden   Administrative bureaucratization  
Academic bureaucratization   Scientiﬁc performance   Research institutions  
Universities
Introduction
Bureaucracy is a factor to be found in many large-scale organizations and in parts of
most public sector organizations (Green 1997, pp. 18–19). The bureaucratization
process is a complex and dynamic aspect based on the use and implementation over
time of tested rules and procedures as a means of introducing order to certain
structural features of formal organizations. Bureaucracy has common connotations
and it is criticized for its rigidity, though in the study of organizations and
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this topic has become a stated policy priority for improving efﬁciency in public
organizations (Keyworth 2006, pp. 260–273). The Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD 2003) review of bureaucracy emphasizes
that, despite the high proﬁle often given to these issues, governments rarely have a
detailed understanding of bureaucratization factors. Green (1997) states that
bureaucracy is becoming less and less the ﬁrst-choice organizational shape format;
however, it is still present in a large number of public administration bodies,
universities and public research organizations. As large national resources of many
countries are used for the research sector, it is interesting to investigate the
bureaucratization process within public research bodies (PRBs) and to understand
whether it affects scientiﬁc performance. The ﬁrst modern studies concerning
bureaucratization within public research units were carried out by Crow and
Bozeman in 1989; they analyse and compare industry, university and government
research units, detecting lower efﬁciency and higher bureaucratization in US
government labs (Crow and Bozeman 1989, pp. 30–32). The fundamental reason for
the low efﬁciency of public bodies is due to the nature of public organizations,
which causes high administrative burden and therefore costs (Heckman et al. 1997,
pp. 389–395; Gore 1993, 1995). As a matter of fact, the bureaucratization of public
research bodies (PRBs) is a poorly developed area of research, though it is an
important topic how to increase their efﬁciency in order to generate technology and
knowledge transfer, which is more and more necessary to modern economic growth
(Coccia 2004, pp. 31–51; Aghion and Howitt 1998). Furthermore, in the absence of
an economic analysis of the relevant causes of bureaucratization in PRBs, the
determination of organizational and scientiﬁc goals will inevitably be a relatively
arbitrary matter (Banarjee 1997, pp. 1289–1332). More speciﬁcally, economic and
managerial studies addressing the bureaucratic issues of the research sector can
underpin better reforms aiming at improving the efﬁciency of public research units
and their efﬁcacy within the national system of innovation in order to boost the
competitiveness of the economy (Lundvall 1992).
1
In order to support decision-making processes, public management and
policymakers must have satisfactory answers to the following questions:
Have public research institutions undergone a process of bureaucratization and, if
so, what kind of bureaucratization?
Does bureaucratization affect the scientiﬁc performance of public research units?
The purpose of this paper is to investigate these issues concerning bureaucra-
tization in PRBs by focusing on an Italian case study, characterized by an interesting
restructuring that has generated major effects on the organizational behaviour of
1 Lundvall states that the national system of innovation (NSI) refers to the complex network of agents,
policies, and institutions supporting the process of technical advancement in an economy. The narrow
deﬁnition of NSI includes the research sector subsystem represented by universities and research
laboratories, while the broad NSI includes many subsystems such as ﬁnance, ﬁrms, government, and so
on. The efﬁciency of this broad NSI boosts economic growth.
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2 This analysis is also important for understanding the strategic change taking
place in public research units. In addition, I compare some results with similar
research carried out in other countries in order to detect similarities and differences.
This research enriches the economic literature about an important topic that has
received several contributions particularly in the Anglo-American scientiﬁc
traditions. First I will review the literature on bureaucratization in PRBs and
describe the methodology of the research; then I will discuss the results and lessons
learned.
Research Institutions and Bureaucratization: A Review of the Literature
Weber (1921, 1964) asserts that bureaucracy is the most modern, rational, and
efﬁcient administrative structure, and it can be applied to any kind of public and
private organization. Weberian bureaucracy entails a formal organization where
work is conducted according to formal rules within a hierarchy based on rational-
legal authority, and individuals are recruited to ﬁll roles in the organization based
on their formal competences and educational qualiﬁcations. Crozier (1964) and
post-Weber scholars (Merton 1970) consider bureaucracy in organizations as
being characterized by slowness and inefﬁciency: the term denotes a situation
where the classical virtues of a Weberian bureaucracy have become perverted.
Conversely, the Austrian school focuses on the economic aspects of bureaucracy
and the distinction between bureaucratic management and proﬁt management
(Von Mises 1944).
Studies on bureaucratization within PRBs have been carried out above all in
North America (Crow and Bozeman 1989, in addition, see Bozeman et al. 1992, pp.
290–322; Bozeman and Stuart 1994, pp. 197–223; Gumport and Pusser 1995, pp.
493–520; Crow and Bozeman 1998; Bozeman and Rainey 1998, pp. 163–189;
Meier et al. 2000, pp. 590–602). In fact, in the second half of the 1980s (Crow and
Bozeman 1989) analysed the National Comparative R&D Study Project, using a
sample of over 900 US research and development labs belonging to industry,
academia and government. This study measures bureaucratization in terms of the
amount of time typically required (in weeks) for each of a variety of policy and
management actions; their analysis shows that government labs are the most
bureaucratized, whereas industry and university labs have merely one third of the
bureaucratization present in public labs.
Gumport and Pusser (1995) analyse Californian universities over a period of
25 years and show that an increase in the number of universities leads to the growth
of administrative structures. During the 1967–1992 period, the expenditure on
administration functions grew disproportionately in comparison with the expendi-
ture on instruction: the ratio of Instruction Expenditure to Administration
Expenditure changed from 6 : 1 to 3 : 1: there was an increase in administrative
2 Studies on bureaucratization in PRBs is yet an unexplored ﬁeld in Italy as well as in other
Mediterranean countries such as Spain, France, Greece, and so on.
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faculty.
Conversely,BozemanandRainey(1998)analysethebureaucraticpersonalitywithin
the National Administrative Studies Project by means of questionnaires presented to
managers of public and private organizations. The analysis shows that both personal
characteristics,suchasalienation,andorganizationalcharacteristics,suchasthenumber
of records kept, showpreferences for more rules. In contrast to expectations and public
administration literature, managers in private organizations (mostly business ﬁrms)
were more likely to prefer more rules than managers in public agencies.
Gornitzka et al. (1998) analyse four Norwegian universities during the 1987–1995
period, showing that there was an increase in Total Administrative Positions in
comparison with Academic Positions. In this study, the growth of administrative
personnel and ofﬁces is seen as an indicator of increasing bureaucratization in
Norwegian universities. These scholars argue that the bureaucratization of Norwegian
universities has taken place because more resources than before are now used for
administration rather than for research and teaching.
This research shows that the concept of bureaucratization often has different
meanings. In some organizational studies bureaucratization denotes the growth of
the part of the organization that does not directly carry out the work but instead
regulates, supervises and supports those who do: it is generated in universities and
public research labs when administrative positions increase over time more than
teaching and research activities. More speciﬁcally, Administrative Bureaucratiza-
tion occurs when administrative positions and activities tend to grow faster than
productive activities and the staff involved in productive activities (Gornitzka et al.
1998). Gumport and Pusser (1995) claim that bureaucratic accretion is the
disproportionate amount of administrative growth related to growth in instruction.
In the majority of cases, the administrative staff in PRBs are engaged in activities
that support researchers in performing and delivering a deﬁned set of ‘output’:
publications, patents, results of research projects, scientiﬁc consultancies and other
scientiﬁc research outcomes. Kogan (1996) points out that bureaucratization in
higher education institutions is also used in two other ways: the move from
individual and academic power to the system or institution, and the growth in the
power of administrators.
A different concept is that of Academic Bureaucratization, when faculty spends
an increasing part of their time on administrative matters: for instance, time spent on
preparing grant and/or project applications, grant and/or project reports, managing
grants and/or projects, recruiting alumni, and so on.
It is interesting to outline some theoretical causes of bureaucratization processes
(Gornitzka et al. 1998):
– Diseconomies of scale if the size and growth of institutions have effects on
bureaucratization processes; this is based on the hypothesis that larger
organizations have higher administrative costs and more personnel, since
complexity itself demands administrative resources.
– Administrative and academic bureaucratization are results of state regulations
and demands from society; universities and public research bodies are
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increasing government pressure to satisfy external expectations. In particular,
the environmental changes for PRBs cause administrative changes and generate
bureaucratization. The resource-dependence theory emphasizes that external
subjects provide the resources, which sustain and develop the activities of
organizations, and to secure a ﬂow of resources, organizations meet the needs
and demands of those providing the resources (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). As a
matter of fact, it is now more common for universities and PRBs to supplement
their public resources with market funding, which is more and more necessary to
fund the activities of researchers: projects funded by the market have different
accounting procedures than those carried out via public funds. Therefore, from a
resource-dependence perspective, the consequences for public research organi-
zations of extracting and cultivating external funding mean administrative
growth (Leslie and Rhoades 1995, pp. 187–212).
– Administrative growth can also be a result of internal processes: the
administrative and academic/scientiﬁc staff support the introduction of new
administrative routines and more administrative staff, as an adaptation to
regulations as well as to environmental changes and complexity. Moreover,
administrators use state regulations to legitimate new activities, when faced with
scientiﬁc staff that are sometimes reluctant to accept new administrative
procedures or to spend funds on administrative activities.
In general, PRBs expand and diversify, performing more tasks in response to
environmental changes (Gumport and Pusser 1995). This adaptation to turbulence
(complexity? uncertainty)generatesbureaucratization.Inotherwords,thescenariohas
changedandthegrowthofadministrativeunitsandburdenthatisassociatedwithgreater
complexityanduncertainty,entailstheconsumptionofmoreandmorepublicresources.
This paper begins by examining the characteristics of bureaucratization in
universities and public research labs. In particular, as government argues that Italian
research institutions and universities are affected by bureaucratization and lower
efﬁciency, the aim is to ﬁnd out whether, similarly to institutions in Norway
(Gornitzka et al. 1998) and California (Gumport and Pusser 1995), there is
administrative bureaucratization also in Italy (i.e., a greater increase, over time, in
administrative staff in comparison with researchers and academics). The paper then
focuses on the largest Italian public research body (the National Research Council)
to investigate the nature of bureaucratization and to ﬁnd out whether bureaucra-
tization affects scientiﬁc performance. It might be expected that increased
bureaucratization would reduce scientiﬁc performance; but before analysing this
main aspect, I will introduce the methodology of the research.
Research Methodology for the Analysis of the Bureaucratization and Scientiﬁc
Performance of Research Institutions
Data are from the Yearbooks of the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT
1991–2004) and the Reports of the Italian National Research Council (in short, CNR)
(Data from Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche Report 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002).
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• Public Research Bodies (PRBs), mainly ﬁnanced by the Government, include:
– research organizations in the strict sense that carry out research activities
with institutional purposes: the Italian Space Agency; the Italian National
Research Council (CNR); the National Agency for New Technologies,
Energy, and Environment; the National Institute for the Physics of Matter,
now part of the CNR; the National Institute of Nuclear Physics; the National
Institute of Statistics; the National Institute of Health, etc.;
– other public institutions controlled by the government (i.e., laboratories and
institutes under the authority of the various departments: retirement and
nursing institutions with scientiﬁc scope, local health authorities, etc.);
• Universities are institutions dealing with both education and scientiﬁc activities;
public as well as private universities are included in the university sector without
distinction.
The internal organization of these bodies is analysed considering:
– Researchers;
– Technicians and ‘other staff.’
More speciﬁcally:
(a) Researchers: scientists involved in the creation of new knowledge, products,
processes, materials and so on. In universities, this heading comprises current
full time faculty, lecturers and teaching assistants, researchers; whereas in the
case of PRBs the heading includes researchers, senior researchers, and
directors of research.
(b) Technicians and research assistants: they support research activities under the
supervision of one or more researchers.
(c) Other staff (assigned to R&D): this group includes workers, secretaries, and
administrative staff involved in research activities.
They are all public servants. Moreover, within the Italian research sector the
ofﬁcial position of technicians and administrative staff is, in some cases, only in the
organization chart, since one can ﬁnd technicians who carry out administrative
activities and vice versa. Aggregate data do not distinguish between technicians and
administrative staff, so they are considered in the same group; whereas in the case of
CNR we are able to analyse these groups separately.
The statistical analysis provides some graphs of time series that show the trends
for each institution. In addition to these geometric ﬁgures, we apply bureaucratic
indicators, i.e., researchers : other personnel ratios. The purpose is to analyse, within
Italian research and academic organizations, the trends of researchers and faculty in
comparison with technicians and administrative staff, so that a comparison can also
be made at an international level with California (Gumport and Pusser 1995) and
Norway (Gornitzka et al. 1998).
Results are presented in the following order: ﬁrstly PRBs, secondly Universities,
and thirdly the Total Research Sector; lastly, the research focuses on the largest
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(abbreviation: CNR).
A second problem that I will investigate is how bureaucratization affects the
scientiﬁc performance of public research units. This issue is analysed by means of a
‘‘face-to-face’’ questionnaire, as this method has several advantages in relation to
the quality of the data collected, though time and costs are higher in comparison
with other techniques. These interviews are carried out in some research units of the
CNR. In particular, the sample includes 100 people (researchers, technicians and
administrative staff) from six institutes and ﬁve decentralized units in Piedmont and
Lombardy, two large regions of Italy with highly developed manufacturing and
commercial sectors and investments in research.
As bureaucratization can also be measured by the time spent on administrative
matters (for instance the time spent on preparing grant and/or project applications,
grant and/or project reports, managing grants and/or projects, and so on—i.e.,
academic bureaucratization) (Crow and Bozeman 1989; Gornitzka et al. 1998) the
relationship between this kind of bureaucratization and research performance of
Italian research units is:
Y ¼ fT 1; T2; T3; T4; T5; T6; T7; N ðÞ
where
Y = average scientiﬁc production (number of domestic and international
publications per institute) per year;
Ti = time spent on the i-th administrative activity;
N = number of documents ﬁlled in.
Remarks: Patents are not good indicators of scientiﬁc production for Italian
research units because they have a low number of patents over time; and some
research ﬁelds such as economics, mathematics, and so on are not able to produce
patents. Consequently, domestic and international publications are preferred as
proxy of the scientiﬁc production of research units.
Moreover, as bureaucratization is a latent variable, it can be measured by the
following manifest variables:
3
T1 = Contract-staff recruitment: average time needed to recruit ﬁxed-term
contract personnel (topic 1 in the questionnaire).
T2 = Organization of events: time needed to organize events such as meetings,
seminars, and conferences (topic 2 in the questionnaire).
T3 = Other scientiﬁc activities: time needed to participate in meetings and to
deal with projects/grants (topic 3 in the questionnaire).
T4 = Drawing up ﬁnal balance sheets and budgets: time needed to compile
budgets and to draw up research project balance sheets, to manage projects/grants,
etc. (topic 4).
3 One of the most relevant and debated topics in the ﬁeld of statistics is the so-called latent variable, i.e. a
variable that is not directly observed, lacking both an origin and a unit of measurement. In particular, a
latent variable is a variable that cannot be measured directly and that is believed to exert a causal
inﬂuence on several variables that are directly observable (manifest variables).
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research project or joint agreement/collaboration to the moment when the project/
agreement starts (topic 5).
T6 = Financial activities: time needed to approve budgets and to make changes
to the expenditure capacity of the research unit (topic 6).
T7 = Purchases: time needed to purchase scientiﬁc material such as books,
journals, personal computers, software, equipment, etc. (topic 7).
N = Documentation (number): number of documents ﬁlled in for scientiﬁc
activity within the research units (topic 11 in the questionnaire).
The relationship is important to answer the question about the variables Ti, N and
Y:i fTi and N increase (indicators of the Academic Bureaucratization, latent
variable), then there is a decrease in variable Y (scientiﬁc production).
The data are analysed by cluster analysis, a non parametric technique, using the
SPSS statistics software. The Cluster Analysis detects a number of subsets within a
set of variables, i.e., clusters, with high internal (intra-cluster) homogeneity and
high external (inter-cluster) heterogeneity. Therefore, if the classiﬁcation is
successful, values within the same cluster are close to each other; whereas values
belonging to different clusters are further away from each other. Each group is then
analysed through descriptive statistics showing its organizational behaviour. The
cluster analysis uses Ward’s method and the squared measure of the Euclidean
distance; results are summarized in the dendrogram.
What Goes on Inside the Public Research Body: Academic or Administrative
Bureaucratization? Results
Analysis of Public Research Bodies (PRBs): 1991–2001 Period
Research personnel in PRBs (Fig. 1) shows that the number of researchers increased
by ?6.8% (arithmetic mean) over 1991–2001; whereas the technical and
administrative staff dropped in average by -7.9%. In addition, the ratio researchers
divided by technicians and administrative staff increased from 0.64 to 0.78 over
1991–2001, though it decreased in two periods: from 0.78 to 0.70 between 1997 and
1998, and from 0.85 to 0.78 between 2000 and 2001.
Analysis of Universities: 1991–2001 Period
Figure 2 shows the trend of personnel in Italian universities in terms of percent
growth. In contrast to PRBs, the university displays a noticeable increase of
technical and administrative staff over researchers: technical and administrative
personnel had an average growth of ?72.5% over 1991–2001; whereas the number
of researchers dropped by -10.3% (arithmetic mean). In addition to this result, the
researchers : technicians ? administrative staff ratio had a falling trend from 2.62
to 0.86 over 1991–2001. This high increase in administrative staff in Italian
universities is due to the establishment of several new universities (from 48 in the
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and staff in smaller Italian cities.
Analysis of the Italian Research Sector (1991–2001 Period)
If we consider the total personnel of PRBs and universities in Italy, results show that
the researchers dropped from 45,661 units (in 1991) to 40,152 (in 2001); whereas
the technicians and administrative staff increased by around 16,000 units over
1991–2001. Figure 3 shows that there is an average increase in technicians and
administrative staff equal to ?23.2%; whereas researchers decrease over time by
-5.5% (arithmetic mean). These data are conﬁrmed by the ratio researchers divided
by technicians and administrative staff, which changed from 1.40 to 0.83 over
1991–2001. Figure 3 also shows that there are three periods in which technicians
and administrative staff increased considerably:
1 1993–1994, from 3.62 to 33.00%
2 1996–1998, from 0.52 to 44.13%
3 1999–2001, from 35.90 to 49.18%
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ItisinterestingtoanalysetrendsinthelargestpublicresearchbodyinItaly,theItalian
NationalResearchCouncil(CNR).CNR(abodysimilartotheFrenchCentreNational
de la Recherche Scientiﬁque, to the German Max-Planck Gesellschaft and to the
Spanish Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientı´ﬁcas) promotes, coordinates, and
regulates Italian scientiﬁc research with the aim of advancing the country’s scientiﬁc
and technological progress. Its research institutes are mainly publicly funded to
produce scientiﬁc research according to general guidelines set by the Italian
Government and the European Union. Until the end of the Nineties, the National
ResearchCouncil(CNR)hadaresearchorganizationbasedonresearchinstituteswith
their own payroll employees, and research centres located in universities and staffed
by a mix of personnel belongingboth to the CNR and to universities. In the 1990s and
early2000stherestructuringoftheCNRhasbeencarriedouttoincreasetheefﬁciency
ofthisstructure.Asamatteroffact,themodernizationofthepublicsector,asameans
of solving ﬁnancial problems due to the shrinking of public research lab budgets, is a
trend in most Western countries (Metcalfe and Richards 1993). Therefore, successive
Italian governments have changed the universe of the CNR research units by
consolidating them from 310 (in 2000) to around 100 institutes. Because of the laws
governingpublicbodies(CNRpersonnelhavethestatusofcivilservants),andbecause
of low mobility and constraints by the Italian labour union, it is impossible to
accommodate the personnel physically all in the new institutes, with a consequent
scattering in more than 200 locations. Consequently, the institutes have their main
headquarters (or institute),plus oneor more decentralizedresearchunits. Infact, only
the name of these new CNR research units has changed; in other words, with this
restructuringtheyaresimplyrelabelledasinstitutesanddecentralizedunits.Asecond
reformoftheItalianCNR(2003)hasshiftedfromlineandstafforganizationtoproject
based organization set up to manage the portfolio of scientiﬁc research projects. This
new reform has created 11 scientiﬁc departments and other hierarchy levels, such as
Department Directors, Project Managers and Work Package Managers.
Data, concerning the period between 1997 and 2002 are from the CNR Reports.
The ﬁgures do not display a high increase in administrative personnel; as a matter of
fact, the ratio researchers divided by administrative staff increased from 3.3 to 3.9
over 1997–2002.
Figure 4 shows a staggering increase in research personnel between 2000 and
2001, from 3,650 to 4,313 units, due to a large wave of recruitment of personnel
carried out during this period; whereas administrative personnel has a lower growth
than researchers (3.1 versus 19.0% in 2002); while technicians have a decreasing
trend over time.
International Comparisons
The results concerning the research sector in Italy are compared to the studies
carried out by Gornitzka et al. (1998) in Norway and by Gumport and Pusser (1995)
in California.
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following periods:
• Italy: 1991–2001 for universities and PRBs, and 1997–2002 for CNR
• Norway: 1966–1991 for university
• California: 1987–1995 for university
The values are standardized using the formula:
DTotalintheperiod
Number of years
The comparisons in Table 1 show that the average yearly growth of adminis-
trative personnel in Italian universities is higher than in Californian and Norwegian
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Table 1 Average personnel growth per year in percentages: comparison between states
University Italy
California Norway University Public research
bodies
National Research
Council
Researchers (%) 4.35 4.25 -1.8 0.28 3.80
Administrative staff
(%)
10.70 6.25 15.2 -1.60 0.62
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Norway); whereas the number of researchers in Italy drops by -1.8%, versus an
increase of ?4.35% in California and ?4.25% in Norway. In the case of PRBs and
the CNR, there is a different situation: the increase of researchers is greater (3.8%)
than that of administrative staff (0.62%). The main results are summarized in
Table 1.
Does Bureaucratization Affect the Research Performance of Public Research
Organizations?
The cluster analysis assembles 11 research units belonging to the CNR into two
clusters of 9 and 2 units respectively (Fig. 5). Descriptive statistics of these groups
display their organizational behaviour (Table 2).
The key to the cluster analysis is that, on the one hand, group B (Table 2)
displays an average scientiﬁc production that is higher than group A; on the other
hand, group B displays also lower average values for all the manifest variables that
are bureaucratization indicators. In a nutshell, in PRBs when the time spent on
administrative activities increases (more academic bureaucratization), scientiﬁc
production of the research institutes decreases over time.
Lessons Learned and Causality Arguments about the Bureaucratization in
Public Research Institutions
Bureaucratization is a complex and dynamic phenomenon that has aspects that are
important for increasing the efﬁciency of research organizations as well as of the
whole economy of modern countries. In fact, the Better Regulation Task Force
(BRTF) in the United Kingdom asserts that bureaucracy reforms could potentially
Fig. 5 Dendrogram of CNR research institutes, using Ward’s method
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increase higher than 1% (Better Regulation Task Force (BRTF) 2005). As a matter
of fact, a lower level of bureaucratization can be a signiﬁcant source of competitive
advantage for a country. The ﬁrst aspect analysed by this paper is the nature of
bureaucratization in public research bodies.
One of the most interesting results is that academia, i.e., Italian universities (Il
Sole 24 Ore Newspaper 2007, 11 marzo, p. 1), have a high level of administrative
bureaucratization: a disproportionate growth of administration staff in comparison
with researchers and faculty—by contrast, Public Research Bodies (PRBs) have
academic bureaucratization. Figure 6 summarizes the results:
More Speciﬁcally:
• Firstly, the organizational behaviour of Italian universities is similar to that of
Californian and Norwegian universities: i.e., the increase in administrative staff
is greater than the increase in researchers (Administrative Bureaucratization).
The nature of this bureaucratization within Italian universities is due to new
universities created by government in several minor cities (from 48 in the 1980s
Table 2 Descriptive statistics of groups A and B generated by cluster analysis of CNR institutes
Arithmetic
mean
a
group A
Arithmetic
mean
a group
B
Standard
deviation
group A
Standard
deviation
group B
Scientiﬁc production 3.069 3.458 1.279 1.708
T1: Contract-staff recruitment 0.402 0.338 0.076 0.012
T2: Organization of events 0.486 0.213 0.125 0.243
T3: Activities in 1 month 0.069 0.013 0.062 0.007
T4: Drawing up ﬁnal balance sheets and
budgets
0.069 0.012 0.072 0.002
T5: Approval by the headquarters 0.872 0.628 0.279 0.039
T6: Financial activities 0.143 0.133 0.032 0.003
T7: Purchases 0.098 0.090 0.026 0.008
N: Documentation (number) 6.264 4.577 1.837 0.322
Number of institutes 9 2 9 2
a Some ﬁgures are low since they are standardized in annual value
T1 = average time needed to recruit ﬁxed-term contract personnel
T2 = time needed to organize events such as meetings, seminars, and projects
T3 = time needed to participate in meetings and to draw up projects
T4 = time needed to compile budgets and to draw up ﬁnal balance sheets of research projects
T5 = time elapsing from the project application or joint agreement/collaboration to the moment when it
starts
T6 = time needed to approve budgets and to make changes to the expenditure capacity of the research
unit
T7 = time needed to purchase scientiﬁc material, books, journals, etc.
N = number of documents ﬁlled in
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123to around 80 in 2009), which have led to the growth of the administrative
apparatus. This supply-driven growth generates new demands from education,
which contributes to the growth of the administrative burden (e.g., students and
professors generally need administrative services in the university). As a matter
of fact, the administrative staff within universities are in a position that allows
them to maximize their own activities.
• Secondly, the bureaucratization of public research bodies has a different nature.
The Italian National Research Council and other PRBs do not have a
disproportionate growth of administrative staff in comparison to that of
researchers (i.e., administrative bureaucratization); on the contrary, they are
permeated by academic bureaucratization due to other causes such as the hasty,
poorly designed and incomplete restructuring that generates structural deﬁcien-
cies. To investigate the causes of this academic bureaucratization, it is important
to analyse in greater depth the restructuring that had the objectives of reducing
general costs and increasing the technology transfer and overall efﬁciency of
Italian research structures. In particular, the ﬁrst restructuring (2001) was a
consolidation among research units in order to create scientiﬁc institutes of
larger size, similar to the Max Planck Institute in Germany, thinking that large
labs = efﬁcient labs. This consolidation has been carried out only from an
administrative and not from a scientiﬁc point of view. Although nowadays there
are about 100 institutes (in the past there were around 310 research units), these
often have several decentralized units (2–6) scattered around the territory and far
from the institute headquarters. It is signiﬁcant that the consolidation has been
creating diseconomies of scale as a consequence of coordination problems
among research units (Coccia and Rolfo 2007, pp. 215–233). In fact, the
horizontal, vertical and geographical differentiations of large organizations need
extra administrative resources to keep the institutions together. Mintzberg
(1983) argues that the different activities of an organization must be coordinated
and controlled, and the larger the organization, the more emphasis will be put on
these tasks. In sum, the ﬁrst restructuring creates diseconomies of scale, due to
the higher costs of co-ordination generated by the administrative burden of all
the decentralized research units (academic bureaucratization). In addition, the
Bureaucratization within Italian PRBs 
depends on the administrative bur-
den which is due to organizational 
change, market activity and adapta-
tion to complexity (Academic Bu-
reaucratization)
This confirms the results of researches car-
ried out in US research labs, showing that 
public labs are the most bureaucratized 
structures (Crow and Bozeman, 1989) 
In Italian Universities, Bureaucratiza-
tion depends on the growth of admin-
istrative staff in comparison with re-
searchers (Administrative Bureaucra-
tization)
This confirms the studies conducted in the 
universities of Norway and California 
(Gornitzka et al., 1998; Gumport and Pusser, 
1995)
Fig. 6 Typology of bureaucratization in Public Research Organizations
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123administrative burden is also due to the duplication of work, resulting from
internal processes in headquarters and decentralized units. In fact, different
decision-making principles operating side by side encourage administrative
growth; but it also appears that a large kernel of this growth lies in the
duplication along a vertical and horizontal dimension in the organizational
structure. The cost of this bureaucratization is invisible in the short run. In
addition to this reform, in 2003 the government decided to launch a new
restructuring based on project management, with the explicit aim of transform-
ing the CNR into a consulting body operating to support ﬁrms. This restructuring
is based on result-oriented planning and cash limit budgeting that affect the
governance of this public research institution. This situation will deserve a much
closer examination in order to ﬁnd other causes of bureaucratization. Actually,
this second reform has been causing other co-ordination problems as a
consequence of a badly designed matrix-structure. The CNR has never really
implemented project management rules; rather, the whole institution hybridizes
project management rules with the old organization to cope with uncertainty and
restructuring gaps. Common features of these two reforms are decreasing public
funds, which are no longer sufﬁcient to cover the current expenses of research
units. In the past, public funding enabled Italian scientists to carry out normal
scientiﬁc activities and to apply for external projects to receive additional
funding. Nowadays, because of decreasing funds, it is impossible to conduct
research solely with public funds and they are not sufﬁcient to support the
structure, which means research equipment cannot be maintained, repaired, or
renewed. Research institutes are forced to apply for market funds to conduct
normal scientiﬁc activities and the market (external) funding is not just an
additional but also a main source of funding for Italian public research units.
This strategic change is functional to cope with environmental threats due to low
public funds (Gioia and Chittipeddi 1991, pp. 433–448).
4 Through these
reforms, the government means to promote multidisciplinary research for the
market and co-operation with the private sector: public research units should be
market-oriented institutions. Basically, I think that this demand-driven effect
generated by external subjects is the second cause of bureaucratization. In fact,
research institutes have a high administrative burden, which is due to the vast
portfolio of research projects for market activity. To support this argument, there
is the resource-dependence theory. PRBs need more time to administer
externally funded activities. Actually, interaction with external subjects involves
drawing up written contracts, ﬁlling out forms and writing reports. More
speciﬁcally, the search for and maintenance of external funding has led to
administrative burden at the central, institute and department level. In short, if
the institutes are providers of technological services to the market, the
administrative burden is a consequence of these activities, since research units
and their staff are not apt for market activity. Furthermore, internationalization
4 In general terms, change involves an attempt to alter the current way of thinking and acting by an
organization’s membership. More speciﬁcally, strategic change involves an attempt to change current
modes of cognition and action to enable the organization to take advantage of important opportunities or
to cope with consequential environmental threats have investigated this topic in depth.
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123as well as marketization of research have administrative consequences on
research institutions: the participation in the European Union’s programmes and
research grants generate an increasing amount of administrative burden.
Gornitzka et al. (1998) show that this has contributed to both academic and
administrative bureaucratization. In addition, the national rules for reducing
public debt have produced laws and regulations concerning the governance of
public administration, to which universities and PRBs must automatically adapt.
This generates internal bureaucratization by means of signiﬁcant administrative
side-effects—an aspect that has been largely overlooked in public policy-
making. Public research institutions have handled this environmental complexity
through bureaucratization based on an increase in administrative burden in order
to manage decentralized research units and the portfolio of market research
projects (academic bureaucratization). Moreover, the strengthening of the
administrative apparatus may channel resources to administrative positions and
not directly to academic and scientiﬁc activities.
To sum up, the main causes of this academic bureaucratization tendency in
PRBs are due to: (a) diseconomies of scale, generated by coordination problems
in decentralized units, increase the administrative burden at the headquarters; (b)
resource-dependence generates the search and maintenance of market funding
and as a consequence the administrative burden to manage the vast portfolio of
external research projects; (c) environmental complexity, which is due to
administrative regulations to reduce national public debt as well as organiza-
tional changes, has generated internal procedures with increasing administrative
burden (i.e., academic bureaucratization).
• Thirdly, it has been interesting to understand how bureaucratization affects the
research performance of public research units. As a matter of fact, the
institutional theory by Chubb and Moe (1990) claims that bureaucracy leads to
poor performance in some public schools. Meir et al. (2000, pp. 590–603)
suggest that poor performance results in a growing bureaucracy and not vice
versa. This research shows that bureaucratization reduces scientiﬁc perfor-
mance; and this is a major problem for public research units, since scientiﬁc
production is more and more important in gaining ﬁnancial support, in hiring
and promoting research staff, and in building a good academic reputation.
However, the cause of this reduction in scientiﬁc production (and efﬁciency) in
the CNR cannot be ascribed to administrative bureaucratization, but rather to
academic bureaucratization. In fact, spending time on administrative activities
for external projects is a poor investment for academics, since career rewards
and personal satisfaction are primarily associated with publications. What this
means is that the resource dependence generates low scientiﬁc production in
terms of scientiﬁc publications, since researchers dedicate an increasing part of
their time dealing with administrative matters, such as preparing grant and/or
project applications, managing grants and/or projects, and so on, that are
necessary in order to obtain market funds (Academic bureaucratization,
Musselin 2007). Goldfarb (2008) supports these results by conﬁrming that
researchers who maintain relationships with external subjects experience a
decrease in publications in leading international journals, implying [the danger]
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123that the careers of academics may be a function of the funding gathered rather
than of talent. This leads to a strong distortion in the efﬁciency of these PRBs.
Concluding Remarks
I have shown that the hasty and uncertain Italian restructuring as well as the
massiﬁcation of academic research
5 have been generating higher academic bureau-
cratization and lower efﬁciency and research production within public research
organizations. The origin of this situation is the lack of a long-term national research
strategyandofaconsistentresearchpolicy(sharedbyItaliangovernmentsofdifferent
political coalitions). Associated with the marketization of scientiﬁc research
(Schuetze 2007, pp. 435–443) this situation has been causing the negative
performance of the whole Italian national system of innovation (Coccia 2005, pp.
377–412). It is reasonable to view the bureaucratization of PRBs not as a process
planned and regulated at a high level in these institutions but as the result of several
small decisions taken at different levels and in various forms, as well as a natural
adaptationofthesestructurestoenvironmentalchangesandcomplexity.Althoughthis
analysis of bureaucratization in public research organizations, focused on the Italian
case study, cannot be transferred directly to other countries, the global tendencies in
this ﬁeld seem to run parallel. We have seen that the administrative bureaucratization
of academia tends to be present in some other states, such as Norway and California,
whereas academic bureaucratization also transpires in some US labs. I believe that
these results are fundamental for the support of strategic change in public research
units in modern turbulent economies. In fact, governments need to be aware of the
negative relationship between the bureaucratization generated by hasty restructuring
and the scientiﬁc production of research units. Although this paper does not provide
exhaustiveﬁndingsaboutallthecontendingcausesandeffectsofbureaucratizationin
public research institutions, the results can support better decisions to improve the
efﬁciency of PRBs. No doubt further research about bureaucratization within public
research institutions is needed to strengthen this important research topic in modern
economic and managerial literature.
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